QUICK & PULSE

In this news digest, we monitor events that impact the environment in the Russian Arctic. Our focus lies in identifying the factors that contribute to pollution and climate change.

Ensuring complete and reliable access to environmental information in Russia has never been fully guaranteed. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it became even more difficult. Some information ceased to be published altogether, such as daily oil production data and annual reports from certain industrial companies. Independent environmental organizations have been banned or closed.

The Arctic region plays a crucial role in comprehending the process of global climate change. Russia owns approximately one-third of its territory, including the exclusive economic zone of the Arctic Ocean. To understand and examine trends, we monitor new legislation, the plans of industry, the Northern Sea Route, international economic sanctions, accidents, and emergencies in the Russian Arctic, as well as provide commentary on the news. Subscribe to our mailing list to make sure you don’t miss the next digest.

Our previous monthly highlights for December can be found here.

Northern sea route and shipping

Year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route remains unavailable ↑

Despite forecasts from Russian officials that year-round navigation on the eastern route of the Northern Sea Route would begin by the end of 2024, this has not happened. As in previous years, shipping is currently limited to the western route with icebreaker escort. This was reported by Ilya Chernov, a representative of Russia’s Ministry for the Development of the Far East and Arctic, on January 29.

Nevertheless, officials continue to express hope for year-round navigation. On January 23, at a roundtable held at the House of the Russian Historical Society on the history of the Northern Sea Route’s development, Vladimir Panov, Deputy Chairman of the State Commission for Arctic Development, stated that establishing year-round navigation along the entire route is a ‘top-priority and urgent task.’ He also noted that experimental voyages had been successfully conducted in cooperation with Sovcomflot and Novatek. This likely refers to the voyage of the LNG carrier Christophe de Margerie, which traveled the Sabetta – Jiangsu (China) – Sabetta route in January-February 2021 under the escort of the icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy.

Panov also announced that a target speed of 10 knots has been set for vessels navigating the eastern section of the Northern Sea Route in winter. In 2024, the average navigation speed along the route was 10.6 knots, compared to 9.8 knots in 2023. Additionally, promoting the history of the Northern Sea Route was named a priority for the Russian Historical Society.

During the “Safe Arctic 2025” drills, emergency scenarios on the Northern Sea Route were simulated only in its western part ↑

From January 29 to 31, the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) conducted the interagency exercises “Safe Arctic 2025” in 10 Arctic regions of Russia. EMERCOM head Alexander Kurenkov noted that the active development of the Arctic and the increase in cargo transportation along the Northern Sea Route inevitably lead to new challenges and threats.

Over the three-day drills, 19 emergency scenarios specific to each region were simulated and practiced, including a train collision, a bus falling through ice, an avalanche at a ski resort, and others.

Two emergency scenarios were simulated in maritime areas:

An accident involving a vessel trapped in difficult ice conditions while navigating the Northern Sea Route in the Arkhangelsk region.

An accident on a nuclear submarine in the Murmansk region.

Meanwhile, the drills did not include scenarios for responding to oil spills in maritime areas, nor did they simulate emergency situations in the eastern part of the Northern Sea Route.

A significant portion of the drills focused not on practical emergency response training but on additional activities, such as educational campaigns, workshops, and sports events. More than 60,000 people participated in these supplementary activities.

International situation in the Arctic and sanctions affecting Russian activities in the Arctic region

New Sanctions from the U.S. and the U.K. ↑

On January 10, the U.S. Treasury Department announced new sanctions against Russia’s energy sector. This move is part of the Biden administration’s final measures to increase economic pressure and prevent a weakening of support for Ukraine ahead of Trump’s inauguration on January 20.

The sanctions aim to limit revenue from Russian energy exports, which partially fund military operations against Ukraine. According to Russia’s Ministry of Finance, oil and gas revenues accounted for approximately 31.7% of total budget revenues from January to November 2024.

Sanctions targeted more than 180 vessels transporting oil and gas, including Russia’s ‘shadow fleet,’ as well as oil traders, service providers in the oil industry, insurance companies, and Russian energy officials. The restrictions affected two major extraction companies, infrastructure facilities, and vessels involved in the development of hydrocarbon fields in the Russian Arctic.

Extractive companies operating in the Arctic zone that have come under sanctions:

“Gazprom Neft” – One of Russia’s largest oil producers, ranking among the top three in terms of oil production and refining volumes. It was also the first company to begin offshore oil production in the Russian Arctic at the Prirazlomnoye field in 2013. In 2014, it launched the first maritime shipments from the Novoportovskoye oil field on the Yamal Peninsula. A significant portion of Gazprom Neft’s operations are located in the Arctic.

“Surgutneftegaz” – Another major oil producer in Russia. The company operates in the Beloyarsky District of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, which was incorporated into Russia’s Arctic zone in March 2024.

More than two dozen subsidiaries of Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegaz have also come under sanctions. Additionally, the document states that all subsidiaries are subject to blocking, even if they are not explicitly listed in the sanctions list.

The UK Foreign Office also announced sanctions against both companies on January 10.

In addition, in January, the U.S. imposed sanctions on 183 vessels, including those involved in hydrocarbon development in the Russian Arctic and servicing the Prirazlomnaya project in the Pechora Sea, the Novy port project in the Ob Bay, and the Varandey Terminal in the Barents Sea:

The largest shipping operator, Sovcomflot, including 54 oil and petroleum product tankers, as well as four LNG carriers—Christophe de Margerie, Pskov, Veliky Novgorod, and Vostochny Prospekt—has come under sanctions. Restrictions also targeted operators Fornax Ship Management FZCO (UAE) and Stream Ship Management FZCO (UAE), which manage tanker fleets and provide services to Sovcomflot.

The floating storage vessels Umba and Kola, each capable of holding up to 300,000 tons of oil and moored in the Kola Bay, have also been sanctioned. Several tugboats involved in transshipment operations, as well as the companies LC Volga and RPK Nord, which own these storage vessels and tugboats, were also targeted.

The shipping company Rosnefteflot and its 14 tankers have come under sanctions.

Gazpromneft Marine Bunker (a subsidiary of Gazprom Neft), a Russian fleet operator and bunkering service provider, was also targeted.

Tankers of the so-called shadow fleet, currently used to transport Arctic oil from the Kola Bay, have also been sanctioned.

Sanctions also targeted two insurance companies, Ingosstrakh and the Alfastrakhovanie Group, which provide coverage for tankers transporting Russian oil and petroleum products. Previously, both companies had been sanctioned by the United Kingdom.

For the first time, U.S. sanctions have targeted oil tankers still under construction at the Zvezda shipyard.

The investigative project Important Stories estimated that the U.S. sanctions imposed in January affected vessels that transported one-fifth of Russia’s oil exports in 2024. According to analytics firm Kpler, the sanctions target tankers carrying about 42% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports, primarily to China.

Arctic projects sanctioned by the U.S. on January 10:

Rosneft’s major oil production project, Vostok Oil, includes the development of oil fields in the Krasnoyarsk region and the construction of infrastructure for oil extraction and transportation on the Taimyr Peninsula.

The Lavna Seaport, a major transshipment port complex on the shore of the Kola Bay in the Murmansk region, which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2024 but is still under construction, was also included in the sanctions list.

Polar Lithium – a joint venture between Norilsk Nickel and Rosatom, established to develop the Kolmozerskoye lithium deposit in the Murmansk region. The project is intended to cover ore mining, processing, and the production of battery materials. The first stage of the mining and processing plant, designed to produce 400,000 tons of ore, is scheduled to launch in 2026. Reaching full capacity of 2 million tons is planned by 2030.

On January 21, changes were made to the Russian state register indicating that Polar Lithium’s charter capital was increased by 1.6 times to 4 billion rubles. Rosatom and Norilsk Nickel each raised their stakes in the company from 1.3 billion to 2 billion rubles.